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The Technology We Exalt Today  
Is Everyman’s Master1 
Evan Peters* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Jones,
2
 Justice Sotomayor rightly articulated 
the need to reformulate privacy law. In Jones, the Supreme Court 
unanimously held that the government’s GPS placement on Antoine 
Jones’s vehicle constituted a search warranting Fourth Amendment 
protection.
3
 On the surface, the result appears to be a win for 
pro-privacy interests.
4
 However, some scholars are cautious about 
what Jones portends for privacy law.
5
 Even the Justices, while 
unanimous in judgment, differed in rationale. The Court split into 
three opinions, authored by Justices Scalia, Alito, and Sotomayor, 
respectively.
6
 
Justice Scalia’s opinion, joined by Justices Roberts, Thomas, and 
Kennedy, departed from the then-accepted formulation of what 
constituted a Fourth Amendment search,
7
 finding the GPS placement 
 
 * J.D. (2014), Washington University School of Law; B.A. (2009), University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor. I would like to thank Professor Mae Quinn for introducing me to the 
topic, to everyone on the Journal editing staff, and, most of all, to my family and friends for 
their patience and support.  
 1. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 757 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 2. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  
 3. The police acquired a warrant but did not fashion the GPS until after the warrant 
expired. All nine members of the Court found the warrantless placement of the GPS to be 
worrisome. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954, 964.   
 4. Jim Harper quoted the decision as a “big win for privacy.” Jim Harper, U.S. v. Jones: 
A Big Privacy Win, CATO INST. (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-v-jones-a-
big-privacy-win/.  
 5. Tom Goldstein called the decision “less of a pro-privacy ruling than many people” 
think. Tom Goldstein, Why Jones is still less of a pro-privacy decision than most thought, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 30, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=138066.  
 6. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945. 
 7. See id. at 947. 
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to be a search of Jones’s physical effect.8 While Scalia’s formulation 
can be easily applied, it might open doors in privacy law that were 
slammed shut in the 1960s, when the Court declined to find a search 
in the mere presence of physical contact or trespass on a person’s 
effects.
9
 
Justice Alito, joined by Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Ginsburg, 
authored a scathing dismissal of Justice Scalia’s decision.10 Justice 
Alito applied the Katz expectation-of-privacy test to the facts, finding 
the long-term monitoring of Jones to be a search.
11
 In finding such a 
search, Justice Alito embraced a mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment 
search protection, which aggregates all surveillance activity as related 
to an event in question in order to find a search.
12
  
Justice Sotomayor issued a separate concurrence, though she 
agreed with parts of both Justice Scalia’s and Justice Alito’s 
opinions.
13
 Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to indicate her 
 
 8. Justice Scalia cited the word “effects” in the Constitution to apply to property. U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV. In this case, the “effect” referred to Antoine Jones’s car, despite the fact 
that it was not actually Antoine Jones’s car but his wife’s car. By focusing on the “effects” 
portion of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Scalia declined to apply the Katz test. Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. at 949.  
 9. In the landmark case of Katz v. United States, the Court reasoned that physical 
intrusion was not an accurate determination for Fourth Amendment cases. See 389 U.S. 347, 
352–53 (1967) (holding the trespass doctrine enunciated in Olmstead and Goldman is no longer 
a controlling test).  
 10. In particular, Justice Alito called the majority’s decision an attempt to solve twenty-
first century privacy concerns using eighteenth century tort law. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957.  
 11. See id. at 964. Justice Alito does not directly address short-term GPS monitoring, but 
the language in his opinion suggests Justice Alito would uphold short-term GPS monitoring. 
See id. at 958 (stating that there was no meaningful interference when the GPS device did not 
interfere with the operation of the vehicle). Further, Justice Alito stated that “relatively short-
term monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy 
that our society has recognized as reasonable.” Id. at 964 (finding that society is comfortable 
with minor surveillance such as video cameras at stoplights). This, perhaps rightly, scares pro-
privacy enthusiasts.    
 12. The mosaic theory asks for judges to aggregate all sequences of government activity 
to see whether, together, they could be seen as a search. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the 
Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012), available at http://www.volokh.com/ 
category/mosaic-theory-of-the-fourth-amendment/. The mosaic theory is new; the original 
Katz analysis asked judges to evaluate each step of an investigation individually. Id.  
 13. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. Specifically, Justice Sotomayor agreed with Justice Scalia’s 
assertion that a physical intrusion is the baseline for Fourth Amendment protection. She also 
agreed with Justice Alito that under the Katz test, the actions taken by the government 
constituted a search. Justice Sotomayor also argued that short-term GPS monitoring would 
constitute a search. See id. at 956.   
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concern that technological advances are outpacing Fourth 
Amendment privacy concerns.
14
 In her concurrence, Justice 
Sotomayor articulated this concern by stating, “[I]t may be necessary 
to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third 
parties.”15 
While each of the three opinions communicates a new way to 
comprehend Fourth Amendment search protection, it is Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence that will likely have the same historical 
impact that Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz has had.16 This Note 
will evaluate Justice Sotomayor’s desire to modify the third party 
doctrine, an aspiration brought on by emerging technology. Part II 
will trace the Court’s historical development of Fourth Amendment 
search protection law in the context of emerging technology, and will 
consider the role the third party doctrine has played in this 
development. Part III will examine current technology, the 
government’s attempts to rectify gaps in the law resulting from the 
third party doctrine, and Justice Sotomayor’s conclusion that it is up 
to the Court to fix the third party doctrine. Part IV will consider 
responses from the academic community to the third party doctrine. 
Finally, Part V will analyze how recent courts have grappled with the 
third party doctrine in the midst of emerging technology, and will 
conclude that the Supreme Court must reformulate its tests for 
privacy law.  
II. HISTORY 
The Fourth Amendment states that “the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
 
 14. See id. at 957. Justice Alito is also aware of this concern, noting that cell phones and 
other wireless devices now permit wireless carriers to track the location of users without having 
to physically implant a GPS monitor. See id. at 963. Justice Scalia, perhaps unsurprisingly, does 
not address this concern. 
 15. Id. at 957. 
 16. The Katz test is articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence as opposed to Justice 
Stewart’s majority opinion. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also John P. 
Elwood & Eric A. White, What Were They Thinking?, 15 GREEN BAG 2d 405, 409 (2012) 
(proclaiming that Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence is the dynamic portion of the decision). 
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unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.”17 This 
clause prevents the government from conducting an unreasonable 
search or an unreasonable seizure in an investigation. Of particular 
interest to this Note is what constitutes an unreasonable search and 
how technological developments over time have affected search and 
seizure jurisprudence. 
A. Search Pre-Katz 
Prior to Katz, decided in 1967, Fourth Amendment search 
protection relied on the presence of a physical trespass. In Olmstead 
v. United States,
18
 a wiretap
19
 was found to not be a protectable 
search because there was no physical trespass.
20
 Chief Justice Taft 
declared, “The language of the [Fourth] [A]mendment cannot be 
extended and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the 
whole world from the defendant’s house or office. The intervening 
wires are not part of his house or office.”21 Likewise, in Goldman v. 
United States,
22
 the use of a detectaphone was found to not be a 
search.
23
  
 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The second clause of the Fourth Amendment states, “[A]nd 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Id.  
 18. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 19. At the time, wiretapping, first used in the 1890s, was a relatively new procedure for 
U.S. law enforcement. William Lee Adams, Brief History: Wiretapping, TIME, Oct. 11, 2010, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2022653,00.html. Olmstead 
was the first case to establish wiretapping’s constitutionality. See id.  
 20. In Olmstead, suspects were convicted of a conspiracy to violate the National 
Prohibition Act by unlawfully possessing, transporting, and importing intoxicating liquors. 
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456–57. The police obtained the evidence chiefly through the 
interception of telephone messages by wiretaps. Id. The wiretaps were executed in the basement 
of a large office building where the conspirators worked, and did not physically trespass on any 
of the conspirators’ property. Id. The wiretaps were up and running for several months. Id. 
 21. Id. at 465. The Court was struggling with assessing the Fourth Amendment’s role as 
applied to new technology. “[O]ur contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what 
may be. The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not 
likely to stop with wiretapping.” Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
 22. 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
 23. A detectaphone is a device that allows one to eavesdrop on a nearby conversation. 
Here, federal agents placed the detectaphone on the wall adjoining the defendants’ office and 
listened to their conversations. Agents used this evidence to prosecute the defendants. See id. at 
131–32.   
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/11
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While Olmstead and Goldman represent the Court’s then-belief 
that an investigative act had to physically break through the 
constitutionally protected area to qualify as a search, this apparently 
bright line rule was subject to subtle distinction. This fine line was 
best exhibited in Silverman v. United States.
24
 The facts in Silverman 
resembled the facts of Goldman,
25
 except that the electronic listening 
device used in Silverman did penetrate the wall, whereas in Goldman, 
the detectaphone rested behind the wall.
26
 The Court in Silverman 
found this penetration to be “an actual intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area.”27  
B. Katz v. United States  
Six years after Silverman, the Court fundamentally altered Fourth 
Amendment search protection in Katz v. United States.
28
 Recognizing 
the impact technological advances were having on police 
investigations, the Court downplayed the importance of the 
constitutionally protected area.
29
 The Court stated, “[T]he Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.”30 Thus, the presence of a 
physical intrusion was no longer a key element in search analysis. 
The Court instead asked whether the person knowingly exposed the 
information to the public, holding, “[W]hat he seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.”31 
 
 24. 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
 25. In Silverman, police officers obtained evidence through use of a spike mike. A spike 
mike is a microphone with a foot-long spike attached to it. The spike mike, like the 
detectaphone, is used to listen to conversations. The police officers placed the spike mike into a 
crevice that reached the suspect’s home by way of a heating duct. See id. at 506. 
 26. See id. at 512 (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Goldman, 316 U.S. at 131. 
 27. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512.  
 28. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the police suspected Katz of illegal gambling. The 
police placed an electronic listening device on the outside of a public telephone booth from 
which Katz placed his calls. The appellate court upheld the monitoring, citing the lack of 
physical intrusion into the constitutionally protected area. See id. at 348–49.  
 29. See id. at 351 (holding that “this effort to decide whether or not a given ‘area,’ viewed 
in the abstract, is constitutionally protected deflects attention”). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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In his concurrence, Justice Harlan established a two-part test to 
determine whether the Fourth Amendment protects what a person has 
preserved as private.
32
 To find a protected search, Harlan’s test 
requires first that “a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”33 The Katz test 
reshaped the definition of what constitutes a search from one of 
physical trespass to an inquiry into both the subjective and objective 
reasonableness of the privacy expectation, based on one’s intent to 
reveal the information and society’s expectation of that intent.34  
C. Post-Katz Search and Emerging Technology 
Since Katz, the Court has grappled with technological advances 
amidst the reasonable expectation concerns. In Smith v. Maryland,
35
 
the Court found the use of a pen register
36
 on a suspect’s home phone 
did not constitute a search. The Court doubted that “people in general 
entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they 
dial.”37 While the defendant likely had the subjective intent to 
maintain his privacy, the Court found society did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily given, 
and held that the use of the phone numbers did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.
38
 
 
 32. See id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 33. Id. at 361. 
 34. Scholarship has largely supported this observation. See, e.g., Caren Myers Morrison, 
The Drug Dealer, The Narc, and The Very Tiny Constable: Reflections on United States v. 
Jones, 3 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 113 (2012); William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth 
Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265 (1999); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts 
About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994). Contra Orin Kerr, The Fourth 
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. 
L. REV. 801 (2004) (finding that property norms are still the basis of post-Katz search 
protection). 
 35. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 36. A pen register is a mechanical device that records numbers dialed on a telephone. It 
does not record the contents of phone calls. The pen register in this case was installed at the 
telephone company to record the defendant’s phone calls, believing the defendant to be the one 
harassing the witness. See id. at 736 n.1. 
 37. Id. at 742.  
 38. For a more in-depth discussion of Smith, see infra notes 83–101 and accompanying 
text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/11
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In Knotts v. United States,
39
 the Court dealt with another new 
form of police surveillance technology, the installation of a police 
beeper.
40
 The beeper allowed agents to track the defendant’s 
movements on a public road. The Court found that placing the beeper 
in a tin and selling it to the defendant was not a search.
41
 The Court 
concluded that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
when traveling on a public throughway.
42
  
In 2001, the Court was faced with determining the 
constitutionality of thermal imaging, in Kyllo v. United States.
43
 The 
Court found that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
within their home as it relates to what can be acquired by powerful 
new technology.
44
 The Court placed an emphasis on the suspect’s 
effort to shield his information from public view.
45
 This attempt to 
keep one’s information secret, the Court found, is what makes the 
intrusion a search.
46
  
As each of these Fourth Amendment technology cases indicates, 
the Court tends to afford protections where it finds a person has an 
 
 39. 460 U.S. 276 (1981). 
 40. A police beeper is a radio transmitter that, when activated, allows the police to track 
the beeper’s movement. Id. at 277. In Knotts, the police suspected the defendant of 
manufacturing illicit drugs, and placed a beeper in a chloroform container that was then 
purchased by defendant. Id. at 278. The police tracked the traveling container on public 
highways to a cabin, where they discovered a drug lab. Id. at 279.  
 41. Id. at 285. 
 42. Id. at 281. The Court took particular interest in the fact that the information obtained 
from the beeper could have been obtained through visual observation of the defendant. Id. at 
282. In United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984), the Court found the obtainment of 
information by a police beeper used within a private residence to be a search, because a person 
does have a reasonable expectation of privacy in her home.    
 43. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). In Kyllo, the government suspected the defendant of growing 
marijuana in his house. Id. at 29. To grow marijuana in a house requires high-intensity heat 
lamps. Id. As such, police took a thermal imaging camera and pointed it at defendant’s house. 
Id. at 29–30. The pictures revealed a high concentration of heat, which the government used as 
evidence against the defendant. Id. at 30.  
 44. See id. at 34. 
 45. Id.  
 46. The government cited Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), as 
evidence that the use of high-powered technology does not always amount to a search. Kyllo, 
533 U.S. at 37. The Court disagreed with the government, holding that people have a greater 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes than they do at an industrial area, where the 
photos in Dow Chemical were taken. Id.  
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active intent to keep the searched information secret.
47
 Generally, if 
the Court finds a person is attempting to keep information secret, the 
Court is more willing to afford that effort Fourth Amendment search 
protection.
48
 However, even when the Court finds that a person has a 
subjective intent to keep information private, if there is voluntary 
disclosure by the person, the Court’s analysis changes. To assess 
whether a person has voluntarily disclosed information, the Court 
applies the third party doctrine.  
D. Third Party Doctrine 
Formulated prior to Katz, the third party doctrine is centrally 
concerned with disclosure. The doctrine focuses on methods through 
which the government acquires information about people it suspects 
of committing a crime. In gathering evidence, the government may 
employ one or both of two techniques without infringing on the 
Fourth Amendment: (1) eavesdropping; and (2) directly participating 
in a conversation, either personally or through a third party 
(characterized as a “false friend”). This “false friend” may use 
technology, such as a wiretap, to document the conversation.
49
  
In Hoffa v. United States,
50
 the Court concluded that the voluntary 
disclosure of information to a third party “false friend” without a 
wiretap is not a search.
51
 The Court stated that the Fourth 
Amendment does not “protect a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a 
 
 47. But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (where the defendant was 
actively attempting to keep the content of his phone conversations secret from the police). In 
Smith, the Court agreed that the content was afforded protection. Id. However, the Court found 
the defendant had no expectation of privacy in information that he voluntarily turned over to a 
third party. Id. at 743–44. Here, the defendant surely knew he was giving the dialed phone 
numbers to the phone company. See id. at 743. Justice Marshall disputed this assertion in his 
dissent. Id. at 749 (stating he did not assume individuals know that the phone company 
monitors phone calls). See infra notes 83–101 and accompanying text. 
 48. Compare Knotts v. United States, 460 U.S. 276 (1981) (where the defendant was out 
in the public), with Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (where the defendant was inside 
his own home, behind his own walls).  
 49. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 100 (4th ed. 2009). 
 50. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
 51. See id. at 302–03. In Hoffa, the defendant was suspected of bribing a jury. Id. at 294–
95. Hoffa’s friend told the government Hoffa had confessed to him that he bribed members of 
the jury, and the friend later testified to that fact at trial. Id. at 295. 
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person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not 
reveal it.”52 At the heart of the analysis is the belief that the defendant 
initiates the conversation and gives up the information voluntarily. 
Therefore, the defendant is afforded no protection regarding what a 
third party does with the information voluntarily provided. 
 In On Lee v. United States,
53
 a government agent, unbeknownst to 
the suspect, secretly listened to a conversation as a suspect gave 
information to a “false friend.”54 The government agent testified 
about the conversation in court. The Court found that even though the 
suspect did not voluntarily give his information to the government 
agent secretly listening, the information given to the informant did 
not constitute a search because the suspect voluntarily gave his 
information to a third party.
55
 Even the act of an agent impersonating 
a prospective buyer was not considered a search.
56
 The Court 
reasoned that so long as the information was given voluntarily, use of 
the information given was not a search.
57
  
Lopez v. United States
58
 stretched this analysis to cover 
undercover agents who wear tape-recording equipment.
59
 The Court 
 
 52. Id. at 302. 
 53. 343 U.S. 747 (1952). 
 54. Id. at 749. In On Lee, the government thought the suspect was trafficking narcotics 
through his store. Id. As a result, they equipped Chin Poy, a former employee of the suspect, 
with a microphone that was wired to pick up sound. Id. The government agents stationed 
themselves directly outside the suspect’s store. Id.  
 55. It is notable that On Lee was decided before the Katz expectation of privacy test. As a 
result, much of the Court’s deliberation focused on whether there was a physical trespass. Id. at 
752–53. The Court concluded that because On Lee consented to Chin Poy’s entrance into the 
store, it was not a physical trespass. Id. at 752–53. This line of reasoning is not followed in 
future cases. However, the second ground for the Court’s decision, that the suspect was talking 
confidently and indiscreetly, allowed for On Lee to survive for future decisions.  
 56. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). 
 57. See id. at 212. In Lewis, the agent, identifying himself as Jim, telephoned the 
defendant to ask if he could purchase some marijuana, telling the defendant they had mutual 
friends. The defendant invited the agent to his home, where they discussed prospective future 
business. They finalized the arrangement and made a second deal two weeks later. See id. at 
207. The Court reasoned that finding a Fourth Amendment violation would unduly limit a 
government agent’s ability to be deceptive. Id. at 210.  
 58. 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
 59. See id. In Lopez, the government agent approached the defendant twice to ask about 
the entertainment at the defendant’s establishment. Id. at 431. The defendant, seeking to avoid 
paying taxes, talked to the undercover agent about an “arrangement.” Id. At the last of these 
meetings, the undercover agent recorded their conversation and presented the recording as 
evidence. Id. at 432. As with On Lee, both Lewis and Lopez were decided before Katz.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 44:103 
 
 
reasoned that since an undercover agent may testify on the basis of a 
conversation, it was reasonable to allow the undercover agent to 
record the conversation. Because the information given to the 
recorded undercover agent was given voluntary, the Court did not 
find the government intrusion to be a search.
60
  
Underlying each of these cases is the rationale that it is immaterial 
whether a party knows that his disclosure of information will be used 
against him. Because each of these cases was decided prior to Katz, 
the Fourth Amendment search protection analysis focused on the 
trespass of the search as opposed to the reasonableness of the 
intrusion. 
E. Third Party Doctrine, Katz, and Emerging Technology 
The Court connected the Katz two-part test with the third party 
doctrine in White v. United States.
61
 In White, a third party recorded 
conversations with a suspect, much like in Lopez.
62
 The Court 
afforded no Fourth Amendment protection to the acquisition of 
electronically obtained evidence, because the privacy interest failed 
the Katz two-part test.
63
 The Court concluded that a suspect had no 
expectation of privacy when he articulated information to a third 
party.
64
 The Court reasoned that this applied to a third party wearing 
an electronic device: “If the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer 
whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither 
should it protect him when that same agent has recorded or 
transmitted the conversations which are later offered in evidence to 
prove the State’s case.”65 The Court recognized the complications of 
 
 60. Because the device in question was not planted by means of an unlawful physical 
intrusion, the use of an electronic device by the undercover agent was not considered a search. 
Id. at 439. 
 61. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
 62. See id. at 746–47. In White, the defendant engaged in four separate conversations with 
a government informant, who was equipped with an electronic monitoring device. Id. 
Government agents listened-in on these conversations and later testified about what was on the 
recording. Id. It is this testimony that was under dispute, not the actual introduction of the 
recording device. Id. However, the Court still looked at whether the information found on the 
electronic recording device was a search. Id. at 747.   
 63. See id. at 747. 
 64. See id. at 749. 
 65. Id. at 752. 
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attaching the two-part test to electronically acquired evidence, 
acknowledging that the Court should “not be too ready to erect 
constitutional barriers.”66 Still, the Court looked favorably on the use 
of electronic monitoring, citing the practice as “a more accurate 
version” of evidence.67  
In his dissent, Justice Douglas chastised the Court for failing to 
comprehend the power that electronic monitoring would afford the 
government, arguing that “electronic surveillance is the greatest 
leveler of human privacy ever known.”68 Justice Douglas believed 
electronic surveillance would have a long-range impact that the 
Founders did not grasp, and that the Court’s conception of societal 
expectations needed to be adjusted to account for new technology.
69
 
Justice Douglas concluded that the “use of electronic surveillance . . . 
uncontrolled, promises to lead us into a police state.”70 
Justice Douglas then performed the same Katz test the majority 
had, but came to a different result, due, in part, to the evolution of 
technology in Fourth Amendment search protection. Justice Douglas 
focused heavily on society’s expectation of privacy and its ability to 
engage in private conversations.
71
 By focusing on these societal 
considerations, Justice Douglas concluded that the electronic 
surveillance performed in White failed the Katz test and was thus a 
search.
72
  
 
 66. Id. at 753. The Court championed the use of electronic recordings in this instance, 
finding an electronic recording “more reliable” than “the unaided memory of a police agent.” 
Id. The Court focused heavily on the accuracy of the electronic recording, and did not give any 
insight into whether the electronic recording itself was a violation, a consideration brought up 
by both Justice Douglas and Justice Harlan in their dissents. See id. at 762 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (believing that electronic surveillance must be subject on its own to Fourth 
Amendment search protection); see also id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
electronic monitoring has no place in our society if it is restricted only by the self-restraint of 
enforcement officials).  
 67. See id. at 753. 
 68. Id. at 756 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. at 760 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 71. See id. at 763. Chiefly, Justice Douglas focused on how a conversation would be 
undertaken if speakers knew the conversation was not private. Id. 
 72. Interestingly, Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Brennan, 
in Katz. 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Douglas 
took particular issue with any attempt by the Court to articulate a clear line of acceptable 
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Justice Harlan shared Justice Douglas’s concern about the 
evolution of electronic surveillance, focusing on “the constitutional 
validity of instantaneous third-party electronic eavesdropping.”73 Yet, 
Justice Harlan applied the Katz test in a different manner than Justice 
Douglas, arguing society’s expectations of privacy were shaped by 
prior Court decisions on what is an appropriate expectation of 
privacy.
74
 Accordingly, Justice Harlan focused on the extent of the 
intrusion.
75
 In this case, Justice Harlan concluded that the practice of 
electronic monitoring, here through a third party, would undermine 
society’s expectation of privacy and “sense of security in dealing 
with one another that is characteristic of individual relationships 
between citizens in a free society.”76 Justice Harlan did, however, 
“leave room for the employment of modern technology in criminal 
law enforcement.”77  
According to Justice Douglas and Justice Harlan, the primary 
third party doctrine inquiry, whether information is voluntarily 
disclosed, should no longer be the pertinent question. Instead, the 
question should be whether both the individual and society have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information disclosed, even 
 
electronic eavesdropping without a warrant. Id. Here, again, Justice Douglas worried about 
unfettered electronic surveillance without Fourth Amendment search protection. Id. at 360. 
 73. White v. United States, 401 U.S. 745, 769 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice 
Harlan noted that the prevalence of electronic surveillance was making feasible the Orwellian 
Big Brother. Id. at 770. Harlan cites Alan Westin’s book Privacy and Freedom to show that 
police officers are cooperating parties that “‘wear[] . . . concealed device[s] that record[] . . . 
conversation[s] or broadcast[] [them] to other[] [police officers] nearby . . . tens of thousands of 
times each year.’” Id. (citing ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 131 (1967)). Justice 
Harlan also wrote a separate dissent to discuss his dissatisfaction with the majority’s decision to 
not overrule On Lee. See id. at 780. In particular, he argued the “validity of the trespass 
rationale was questionable” at best and no longer relevant, given the ruling in Katz. Id. at 774. 
Further, Justice Harlan found the prior trespass rationale, central to Fourth Amendment search 
protection, to “have been destroyed.” See id. at 784. 
 74. See id. at 786. 
 75. See id. Another landmark Fourth Amendment case, Terry v. Ohio, had recently been 
decided. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). While Terry focused on the necessity of a warrant for a police stop, 
Justice Harlan found the policy concern in Terry, namely the self-restraint required by law 
enforcement officials, to be particularly relevant to the search protection discussion in White. 
See id. It is unclear whether a minor intrusion would be acceptable for Harlan under White.   
 76. Id. at 787. 
 77. Id. at 790. Again, Justice Harlan did not explain just what room should be given to 
technology. However, he did suggest that the issue should be decided “in the stream” of Fourth 
Amendment search protection. Id. 
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if it is voluntarily disclosed. Thus, the technology involved with the 
disclosure becomes a critical component in the third party doctrine. 
A few years later, in United States v. Miller,
78
 the Supreme Court 
applied the third party doctrine to bank records.
79
 The Court reasoned 
that society did not have a sufficiently reasonable expectation of 
privacy in bank records where the defendant voluntarily gave his 
information to the bank. The Court explained:  
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a 
third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, 
even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it 
will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence 
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.
80
  
In his dissent, Justice Brennan pushed back on the third party 
doctrine, arguing that the defendant did not forsake all of his Fourth 
Amendment rights when he willfully gave his information to the 
bank. Justice Brennan rationalized that, since everyone essentially 
needs a bank account, it does not follow that society then expects a 
bank might give a person’s bank information to the police. If such 
were the case, then all bank information would be public.
81
 To allow 
a policeman to access bank records upon request “opens the door to a 
vast and unlimited range of very real abuses of police power,” Justice 
Brennan argued.
82
  
Smith v. Maryland
83
 addressed the application of technology to the 
third party doctrine.
84
 In Smith, the Court limited its Fourth 
 
 78. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 79. See id. In Miller, the government suspected the defendant of operating an illegal 
distillery. Id. at 436. As a result, the government requested copies of checks and other bank 
records from the defendant’s bank. Id. The defendant moved to suppress this evidence, arguing 
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy that the documents would be kept in secret, pursuant 
to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. Id. Ironically, while the bank kept the records at the behest of 
the government to keep them secret, it was only because the bank complied that the documents 
could be shared with the government. See id. at 443. 
 80. Id.  
 81. See id. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 82. Id.  
 83. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  
 84. See id. In Smith, a robbery victim gave a description of her assailant to the police. Id. 
at 737. After giving the description, the victim began seeing a car that matched the assailant’s 
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Amendment review to the question of whether the police committed a 
violation when they gathered information on the defendant through 
the phone company, a third party. The Court avoided the question of 
whether it was an electronic intrusion
85
 and instead focused on 
whether the defendant had an expectation of privacy regarding the 
phone numbers he dialed.
86
 The Court concluded that a person does 
not have an expectation of privacy in such a context.  
As to the first prong of the Katz test, whether the defendant 
himself harbored any expectation of privacy, the Court reasoned that 
since subscribers see their bills, they must realize that the phone 
company has the means of cataloging the numbers dialed.
87
 The 
Court explained, “[I]t is too much to believe that telephone 
subscribers . . . harbor any general expectation that the numbers they 
dial will remain secret.”88 The Court rationalized that a person, by 
voluntarily dialing the numbers, has consented to the phone 
company’s release of that information.89 
As to the second prong, whether society has an expectation of 
privacy regarding the phone numbers they dial, the Court, invoking 
the third party doctrine, found that this expectation would be 
unreasonable. The Court said, “This Court consistently has held that a 
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he 
 
vehicle around her house. Id. Then, the victim began receiving threatening phone calls from a 
man identifying himself as the robber. Id. The victim went back to the police, who found the 
defendant by running a trace on the vehicle. Id. Then, the police wiretapped the defendant’s 
phone through the phone company without a warrant. Id. The device used to wiretap the phone 
company was a pen register. Id. A pen register is a device that traces outgoing signals from a 
specific phone or computer to their destination, producing either a list of phone numbers or 
Internet addresses. Id. at 736. A pen register does not provide any substantive information, such 
as the content of the phone conversations or websites. See Pen Register, LEGAL INFO. INST. 
(Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/pen_register.   
 85. The Court noted that because the pen register did not acquire the content of 
messaging, the pen register did not require heightened scrutiny like a listening device. Smith, 
442 U.S. at 741. 
 86. See id. at 742. This information is called envelope information, because it is 
information that can be found on the outside of a mailed letter, as opposed to content 
information, which is information that can be found inside the mailed letter. See Matthew J. 
Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 
2112 (2009). 
 87. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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voluntarily turns over to third parties.”90 Similar to the first prong, 
because people voluntarily use their phones, they voluntarily turn 
over the numbers dialed to the phone company, assuming the risk that 
the phone company will turn over those numbers to the police.
91
 As a 
result, the wiretap was not held a search.
92
 
Justice Stewart, along with Justice Brennan, disagreed with this 
final point. Justice Stewart reasoned that “numbers dialed from a 
private telephone . . . are not without content.”93 Because phone 
numbers by themselves can reveal persons and places dialed, it did 
not follow that society has no expectation of privacy in the disclosure 
of phone numbers to a third party.
94
 Because society does not expect 
this disclosure, Justice Stewart would have held the electronic 
wiretap a search.
95
 
Justice Marshall, along with Justice Brennan, leveled a critique of 
the first prong of the Court’s analysis, arguing that “it does not follow 
that [a person] expect[s] this information to be made available to the 
public in general or the government in particular.”96 Further, “[t]hose 
who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited 
business purpose need not assume that this information will be 
released to other persons for other purposes.”97 Justice Marshall 
understood that the notion that “the defendant presumably had 
exercised some discretion in deciding who should enjoy his 
confidential communications” is an incorrect presumption.98 The pen 
register, by automatically recording the information, prevented the 
defendant from exhibiting any choice in the matter. As such, 
according to Justice Marshall, the Katz analysis “depends not on the 
 
 90. Id. at 743–44 (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–44). 
 91. See id. at 744. The Court did not address whether it was reasonable but only whether 
people do it on a day-to-day basis. 
 92. Id. at 746. 
 93. Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 94. See id. Justice Stewart also took issue with the fact that the phone numbers were 
dialed from inside the defendant’s home, noting that under the first prong, a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in numbers dialed from within her own home. See id. at 747. 
 95. Justice Stewart also disregarded the technological advancement of the wiretap and 
merely assessed whether the phone numbers fell under Katz, concluding that they did. See id. at 
747–48 (Stewart, J., dissenting).   
 96. Id. at 749. (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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risks an individual can be presumed to accept when imparting 
information to third parties, but on the risks he should be forced to 
assume in a free and open society.”99  
This strict reading of the third party doctrine was based on Justice 
Marshall’s fear of “unregulated government monitoring” through the 
use of new technology, such as pen registers.
100
 To restrict the 
government’s use of this new technology, Justice Marshall sought to 
narrow the third party doctrine to the purposes for which the 
acquiring party obtains the information. In this instance, the 
defendant volunteered his information “solely for the phone 
company’s business purposes.”101 Therefore, the defendant retained a 
privacy interest in the phone numbers when used for something else, 
such as a government investigation.  
Following the aforementioned cases, the third party doctrine has 
become a zero-sum game for citizens. Citizens have a choice: they 
can either keep their information strictly private or give up all Fourth 
Amendment rights to the information, regardless of whether they give 
up that right knowingly or unknowingly, willingly or unwillingly.
102
 
In other words, “as technology becomes more embedded in society, 
consumers will be increasingly forced to waive their Fourth 
Amendment rights in order to obtain vital goods and services.”103 
III. THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE’S STRANGLEHOLD 
ON TODAY’S PRIVACY LAW 
Since Miller and Smith, consumer technology can now be found in 
most U.S. households.
104
 Products such as the personal computer and 
 
 99. Id. at 750. Justice Marshall cited Justice Harlan’s White dissent, finding it important 
that the “task of the law [is] to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect,” and that “we 
should not . . . merely recite . . . risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon 
society.” Id. (citing White, 401 U.S. at 786). 
 100. Id. at 751. 
 101. Id. at 752. 
 102. See Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared 
Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 211, 245 (2006). In their article, 
Brenner and Clarke push back against the assumption of the risk doctrine imbedded in the third 
party doctrine. See id. at 280.  
 103. Id. at 245–46. 
 104. For instance, in 2011, thirty-two years after Smith, CNN reported that 90 percent of 
Americans owned some form of consumer technology. Amy Gahran, Report: 90% of 
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the smartphone have allowed the average American to access their 
personal calendars, notes, e-mails, and bank records at home, and to 
make purchases on-the-go.
105
 As a result, technology concerns under 
the Katz test no longer focus on what technology police possess that 
the general public does not, but instead focus on what technology the 
general public has access to that the police can utilize in a search.
106
 
New technology presents an obvious flaw in the third party 
doctrine’s ability to protect the American citizen. Take email, for 
example. Alex sends Bob an e-mail through his Yahoo! e-mail 
account. While Alex initially has a privacy interest in this e-mail, his 
disclosure to Bob relinquishes that right through the third party 
doctrine, and Bob may disclose the e-mail to government authorities. 
However, Yahoo! the company may disclose the email, as well, 
because they have also “seen” the e-mail. The government can 
compel Yahoo! to disclose Alex’s e-mail, and Alex cannot object 
because he has lost his privacy interest.
107
 This is troubling, because 
the same logic extends to someone who uses the internet through an 
internet service provider (ISP). Under the third party doctrine, that 
 
Americans own a computerized gadget, CNN (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/ 
mobile/02/03/texting.photos.gahran/. In addition, PC sales had risen from 48,000 in 1977 to 125 
million in 2001. Michael Kanellos, PCs: More than 1 billion served, CNET (June 30, 2002), 
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1040-940713.html. Further, in 2009, 47 percent of Americans used 
online banking. See Lance Whitney, Online Banking is Booming, CNET (June 16, 2009), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1001_3-10265409-92.html. 
 105. Average Americans can use wireless broadband access, Wi-Fi (wireless local area 
network), and wireless ISP (internet service provider) on their smartphones or computers to 
perform these activities, perhaps soon at no subscription cost to the consumer. See Christina 
Thomas, Google 2013: Could Wireless Internet Be Free Soon!?, TECHNORATI (Jan. 24, 
2013), http://technorati.com/business/article/google-2013-could-wireless-internet-be/. See also 
MARY J. CRONIN, BANKING AND FINANCE ON THE INTERNET (1997) (explaining the impact 
financial service institutions can have in the marketplace by embracing the internet). 
 106. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). In addition to addressing privacy 
interests in a home, in Kyllo, Justice Scalia expounded upon the fact that the thermal imaging 
device the police used was “not in general public use.” Id. at 34. See also supra notes 43–46 
and accompanying text. 
 107. One only needs look at the recent controversy surrounding General David Petraeus to 
see how easy it is for the FBI to look at a consumer’s e-mails. The Department of Justice will 
not release exactly how they obtained the scandalous e-mails, but they purport their tactics were 
legal. See Scott Shane, Online Privacy Issue is Also in Play in Petraeus Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 13, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/us/david-petraeus-case-raises-
concerns-about-americans-privacy.html?_r=0. In essence, when the FBI searched Paula 
Broadwell’s e-mail in relation to a harassment complaint, they were able to look at older, non-
protected e-mails in her account, which revealed the affair. See id.  
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person will have relinquished any privacy rights if the ISP chooses to 
disclose such information.  
Utilizing the third party doctrine, courts have increasingly 
concluded that a person loses her privacy interest when she interacts 
with technology.
108
 Faced with this troubling trend, Congress has 
attempted to parry back.  
A. Congress and the Third Party Doctrine’s Technology Conundrum 
Recognizing the privacy hole created by new technology under 
the third party doctrine, Congress acted to fill the gap with the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA)
109
 and, 
sixteen years later, the Stored Communications Act (SCA).
110
 Despite 
these noble attempts, these statutes have proven ineffective.
111
 In fact, 
the U.S. government continues to obtain a great deal of personal 
information from private citizens. From July 2012 to December 2012, 
 
 108. Courts have largely concluded there is no privacy interest in a wide array of 
information held by third parties. United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 07-CR-0023-NHS/AJB, 
2008 WL 4200156, at *8 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (finding no privacy interest in historical cell site 
information). See also United States v. Hynson, No. 05-576, 2007 WL 2692327, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 
2007) (cell phone records); United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1077-78 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(credit card statements); United States v. Starkweather, No. 91-30354, 1992 WL 204005, at *1-
2 (9th Cir. 1992) (kilowatt consumption from electric utility records); United States v. Willis, 
759 F.2d 1486, 1489 (11th Cir. 1985) (motel registration records); and United States v. 
Hamilton, 434 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (D. Or. 2006) (employment records).     
 109. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (1986). The ECPA was designed to protect in-transit 
communications, such as wire transfers, from being intercepted. 
 110. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2002). The SCA is a subset of the ECPA. It specifically 
protects stored data transmissions, such as e-mails, from being intercepted through an ISP. 
Other important subsets of the ECPA include the Wiretap Act, codified at Title I of the ECPA, 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2002), which protects voice communications, as well as certain 
electronic communications. The exclusionary rule applies to voice communications under the 
Wiretap Act, but it does not apply to electronic communications under either the Wiretap Act or 
the SCA. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 316–17 
(4th ed. 2012). 
 111. This is due to substantial loopholes in the statutes. One such loophole is the compelled 
e-mail disclosure rule. Under this rule, an e-mail that is sitting in an inbox opened for 180 days 
is considered abandoned and loses Fourth Amendment protection. See Orin Kerr, A User’s 
Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1218 (2004). The U.S. Congress is debating closing the loophole; an 
amendment to the ECPA that would close the loophole has left committee and gone to the floor. 
See Hanni Fakhoury, 2012 in Review: Steps in the Right Direction for Email Privacy, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 26, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/12/2012-review-steps-
right-direction-email-privacy.  
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the U.S. government made 21,389 requests for user data from 
Google, alone.
112
  
Professor Daniel J. Solove has criticized the effectiveness of 
legislative efforts to keep up with Fourth Amendment search 
protection.
113
 Recognizing that citizens must “plug in”114 to society, 
Professor Solove chastised Congress’s statutory regime as archaic 
and pedantic.
115
 In particular, he focused on the holes in the regime, 
“such as information collected by websites.”116 As a result, he 
concluded that Congress has failed to protect the privacy interests of 
its citizens, and that it is up to the Court to rid us of this “gap-riddled 
statutory regime . . . [and] reverse Smith v. Maryland and United 
States v. Miller.”117 
Recently, Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky) introduced a bill in the 
Senate to change the current statutory regime.
118
 If passed, Senator 
 
 112. See Transparency Report: What it takes for governments to access personal 
information, GOOGLE BLOG (Jan. 23, 2013), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/ 
transparency-report-what-it-takes-for.html.  
 113. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 (2002). 
 114. Id. at 1089. Professor Solove details the ways in which citizens disclose information 
to a third party, from connecting to an ISP, to opening an account with a cable company, to the 
various records citizens maintain with doctors, lawyers, and businesses. See id. 
 115. See id. at 1138. 
 116. See id. at 1148. Additionally, records kept by internet retailers and websites are not 
protected under the ECPA. See id. 
 117. Id. at 1151. However, because the Fourth Amendment’s primary remedy for violations 
is the exclusionary rule, Professor Solove recognizes that Fourth Amendment search protection 
is not enough to adequately protect citizens, and that some form of a statutory regime must 
exist. See id. 
 118. In May of 2013, NSA programmer Edward Snowden released NSA documents to the 
Guardian and the Washington Post, both of which subsequently released the information to the 
public. Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism program taps into user data of Apple, 
Google and Others, GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data; Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British intelligence 
mining data from nine U.S. Internet companies in broad secret program, WASH. POST, June 6, 
2013, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-06/news/39784046_1_prism-
nsa-u-s-servers. Edward Snowden also sat down for a video interview. Video Interview by 
Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald with Edward Snowden, GUARDIAN, June 9, 2013, 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2013/jun/09/nsa-whistleblower-edward-
snowden-interview-video. President Obama quickly responded, stating, “Nobody is listening to 
your telephone calls.” Lucy Madison, Obama: “Nobody is listening to your telephone calls,” 
CBS NEWS, (June 7, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57588239/obama-nobody-
is-listening-to-your-telephone-calls/. Since the disclosure, more revelations about the NSA’s 
technological reach have come to light. Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 44:103 
 
 
Paul’s bill, the Fourth Amendment Preservation and Protection Act of 
2013, will drastically curb the ability of law enforcement officials to 
use the third party doctrine.
119
 As of November 2013, the bill is 
currently in committee.
120
  
B. The Supreme Court’s Task 
Congress has thus far failed to keep up with technology in 
protecting our privacy interests. This is in large part due to 
Congress’s inability to legislate around the rigid third party doctrine. 
Because of the third party doctrine, society has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information disclosed to a third party.
121
 
Thus, it is up to the Supreme Court to regulate where the legislature 
has failed to act.
122
 
 
Nearly Everything a User Does on the Internet, GUARDIAN, July 31, 2013, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data. Of particular 
note is the disclosure that the federal government has not only mass collected Americans’ 
telephone communications data but has kept these collections from Congress. Peter Wallsten, 
House Panel Withheld Document on NSA Surveillance Program from Members, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 16, 2013, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-16/politics/41417421 
_1_briefings-congress-surveillance-program. Following the disclosure, President Obama 
reassured the public that changes will be made to both the NSA mass surveillance program and 
to the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISA Court”), the secret court 
that oversees the constitutionality of NSA programs. Scott Wilson & Zachary A. Goldfarb, 
Obama announces proposals to reform NSA surveillance, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2013, available 
at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-09/politics/41225487_1_president-obama-news-
conference-edward-snowden. While the discussion surrounding the NSA surveillance program 
does concern the constitutionality of mass surveillance programs under the Fourth Amendment, 
this Note is focused on how the third party doctrine impacts technology and individual 
surveillance. 
 119. Fourth Amendment Preservation and Protection Act of 2013, S. 1037, 113th Cong. 
(2013), available at http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1037. 
 120. Id. 
 121. As Justice Harlan noted in his White dissent, society’s “expectations, and the risks 
[individuals] assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules, and the 
customs and values of the past and present.” United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). In other words, society’s expectations are based primarily on what the 
Court deems them to be. If the Court applied the third party doctrine differently, society’s 
expectations would adjust. See supra notes 61–77 and accompanying text. 
 122. See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1515 
(2010) (arguing it is up to courts to craft rules when the legislature has not adopted an 
all-inclusive regime). But see Unites States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (stating that in the midst of dramatic technological change, this problem seems best 
left to the legislature).  
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Justice Sotomayor agrees. As Justice Sotomayor wrote in United 
States v. Jones, it is time “to reconsider the premise that an individual 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties.”123 Further, the third party doctrine “is ill 
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”124  
Applying the Katz test to the facts in Jones, Justice Sotomayor 
concluded that neither prong was satisfied. She doubted that people 
truly recognize they are forsaking privacy rights when they interact 
with technology on an everyday basis.
125
 Further, Justice Sotomayor 
contended that, even assuming people do know they are forsaking 
rights, the second prong of the test regarding societal expectations is 
not satisfied. She doubted “that people would accept without 
complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of 
every website they had visited in the last week, or month, or year.”126 
Even though she found neither prong of the Katz test satisfied, 
Justice Sotomayor argued that the third party doctrine and its 
emphasis on secrecy stands in the way of protecting one’s privacy.127 
According to Justice Sotomayor, the only way to properly apply the 
Katz Test is “if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat 
secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.”128 For this reason alone, Justice 
Sotomayor explained she “would not assume that all information 
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited 
purpose is . . . disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”129 
 
 123. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. In particular, Justice Sotomayor discussed the ways in which people use 
technology and inadvertently voluntarily release their privacy rights. Id. She noted that people 
“disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they 
visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service providers; 
and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers.” Id. Justice Alito 
responded to Justice Sotomayor’s critique, commenting that people may actually prefer 
“increased convenience . . . at the expense of privacy.” Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring).   
 126. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 127. See id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979)). Justice Sotomayor chose not 
to posit a new test, as she joined the majority’s reasoning that the government physically 
intruded upon the defendant’s “effects.” Id. 
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IV. RESPONSES TO THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE 
AND TECHNOLOGY
130
 
There has been a variety of responses to the third party doctrine, 
the question of whether it should be reformed, and, if it should be 
reformed, how and by whom. For example, while Justice Sotomayor 
is open to a judicial reinterpretation of the third party doctrine, 
Professor Orin Kerr
131
 strongly insists that the Court should not 
meddle with the third party doctrine.
132
 In his article “The Case for 
the Third-Party Doctrine,” Professor Kerr argues that the third party 
doctrine provides authorities with a clear window to prosecute savvy 
criminals.
133
 More importantly, he argues, the third party doctrine is 
unambiguous.
134
 Without the third party doctrine as it is currently 
articulated, “courts would face the difficult challenge of creating a 
clear regime of Fourth Amendment protection for third party 
information.”135  
Professor Kerr believes the third party doctrine is essential to the 
government’s ability to bring criminals to justice, because it “requires 
technological neutrality.”136 Using legendary Teamster “Jimmy” 
Hoffa as an example, Professor Kerr argues that if Hoffa had the 
option of using a third party to hide his misdeeds, he would have 
done so.
137
 The third party doctrine prevented Hoffa from using that 
third party; it encapsulated Hoffa’s misdeeds to Hoffa alone and 
prevented him from personally escaping justice.
138
 
 
 130. As will be discussed infra, Professor Kerr and Professor Epstein’s solutions to the 
third party doctrine’s technology conundrum are to keep the third party doctrine as it currently 
stands.  
 131. Professor Orin Kerr is the Fred C. Stevenson Research Professor of Law at George 
Washington University Law School. 
 132. For instance, Professor Kerr finds fault with the move towards a mosaic theory of 
search protection. See Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 12.  
 133. Orin Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 564 
(2009). 
 134. See id. at 565. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 580. 
 137. Id.  
 138. See id at 588. Indeed, in his article, Professor Kerr argues Fourth Amendment privacy 
rights are a two-way street when it comes to technology. That is, if we fear that Fourth 
Amendment search protection can be threatened by technological practices, so too must we fear 
that they may be expanded. See id. 
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Even more important to Professor Kerr is the clarity provided by 
the third party doctrine, which he believes is imperative, given the 
muddiness of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
139
 Indeed, it is a 
clear prophylactic rule: if A tells a secret to B, A loses that privacy 
interest.
140
 “[R]ights in information extinguish when the information 
arrives at its destination.”141 Furthermore, according to Kerr, there is 
no better alternative.
142
  
Despite Professor Kerr’s belief that the third party doctrine’s 
neutrality and clarity justify its continued use, neither of these virtues 
effectively tackles the challenge brought by the reach of 
ever-developing technology. For instance, while the third party 
doctrine is perhaps technologically neutral,
143
 it is not neutral in 
application. This is because the third party doctrine focuses on the 
privacy interests of the guilty,
144
 reasoning that the guilty person is 
aware of the possibility for a third party to disclose information.
145
 
However, an innocent person simply may not have the same 
awareness.
146
 Thus, the third party doctrine appears to focus on the 
guilty at the expense of the innocent; and this is hardly neutral. 
Yet, Professor Kerr holds fast to the third party doctrine, arguing 
that an ever-evolving search protection that applies to emerging 
technology would prove impossible to maintain.
147
 While Professor 
Kerr admits the third party doctrine, as it is currently applied, is not 
 
 139. Id. at 566. 
 140. Id. at 582. 
 141. Id. at 581. 
 142. Id. at 586. 
 143. See Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 133, at 580. 
 144. See Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the 
Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1252 (1983). 
 145. See id. at 1253. 
 146. See id. at 1253–55. Professor Loewy hypothesizes about the gossiping innocent. In his 
hypothetical, he compares the impact of a statement made to a police officer directly by an 
individual versus someone who made a statement to a friend about a police officer. Professor 
Loewy contends that an innocent party still possesses a privacy interest, even if they have 
nothing to hide. Because of this belief, the third party doctrine is not neutral but rather unduly 
harms innocents. See id.    
 147. See Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 133, at 586. Professor 
Kerr examines a totality of the circumstances-style test, concluding the third party doctrine 
would provide better clarity for police. See id. But see Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the 
(Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest 
of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975 (2007) (finding that a factors test is a better system).  
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perfect,
148
 he would more readily see the third party doctrine continue 
than see the Court throw the doctrine in limbo. Instead, he argues, 
adjustments to privacy law based on technological advances are best 
suited for legislative repair.
149
 
While Professor Kerr provides a powerful argument for upholding 
the third party doctrine, Professor Epstein
150
 has chartered a middle 
ground approach between critics and supporters of the third party 
doctrine.
151
 Professor Epstein zeroes in on the two tenets of third 
party doctrine: assumption of the risk and reasonable expectations.
152
 
He argues that the Court could better protect privacy interests and 
keep the third party doctrine intact if it focused more on assumption 
of the risk.
153
 According to Epstein, it is important to remember that 
“assumption of the risk is forced on individuals by positive law. It is 
not consensually assumed.”154 Thus, simply using a technology does 
not generate acquiescence of one’s societal right; rather, protection 
may be limited by the actions of the holder.  
This squares with Professor Epstein’s conception of reasonable 
expectations under the third party doctrine. Professor Epstein likens 
the third party doctrine to an experience at a crowded restaurant.
155
 
Sure, people can hear what is said at other tables, but it is considered 
impolite to lean over to listen better. Similarly, just because one 
person talks loudly doesn’t make it reasonable to lean in. Simply put, 
reasonable expectations are not an all or nothing proposition.
156
 
 
 148. In a perfect world, Professor Kerr would prefer the third party doctrine to rest fully in 
the first prong of the Katz test, where disclosure of information would turn on whether the party 
chose to disclose it, as opposed to whether society believes the information to have privacy 
rights. See Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 133, at 588–90.  
 149. See id. at 596–97. But see Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and 
Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747 (2005) 
(arguing Professor Kerr is incorrect in asserting legislatures can solve privacy law issues).  
 150. Professor Epstein is the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law 
and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. 
 151. See Richard Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the Common Law of 
Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199 (2009). 
 152. See id. at 1202. 
 153. See id. at 1204. Professor Epstein uses the example of walking outside. One sees cars 
every day when walking, and one knows that they are dangerous, but one does not assume the 
risk of the danger. See id. 
 154. Id. at 1206.  
 155. See id. at 1215.  
 156. See id. 
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Professor Erin Murphy has pushed back on both Kerr’s warm 
embrace and Epstein’s muted acceptance of the third party 
doctrine.
157
 Professor Murphy counters Professor Kerr’s technology 
neutrality claim, arguing that most crime doesn’t have technological 
alternatives.
158
 As a result, the idea that the third party doctrine is 
preventing criminals from using third parties to commit crimes is 
weak at best.
159
  
Instead of the all-or-nothing third party doctrine, Professor 
Murphy would call for a sliding-scale approach that embodies 
“important communal and constitutional values.”160 Once the sliding 
scale is established, enforcement would be akin to current 
enforcement of the third party doctrine. And as technology 
developed, different values would be slotted into the sliding scale. In 
contrast to Kerr’s assertions, Murphy argues that it doesn’t matter if it 
is unclear for government enforcement, because the government still 
has the ability to seek a warrant.
161
 
But how could the Supreme Court apply a flexible approach such 
as the one proffered by Professor Murphy? Professor Stephen 
Henderson suggests that the Supreme Court should look to where the 
Fourth Amendment is applied on a daily basis—state courts.162 
Professor Henderson focuses on nine factors that states routinely 
consider when information is disclosed to a third party.
163
 The factors 
 
 157. See Erin Murphy, The Case against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to 
Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239 (2009). 
 158. See id. at 1243. In fact, according to Professor Murphy, even if the defendant had 
gone the technological route, he still would not have been protected. However, if he simply 
mailed the stalking letter, then he could have been safe. Id. at 1244–45. 
 159. See id. at 1245. 
 160. See id. at 1252. Factors in her sliding scale include “the role of trust, the notion of 
agency, the need and desirability of third party confidences, and some idea of autonomy and 
consent.” Id. These factors could be used to determine the level of protection. See id. 
 161. See id. at 1253. The dichotomy between Professor Kerr and Professor Murphy lies in 
the relative ease with which an officer may obtain a warrant under the warrant clause. 
 162. See Henderson, supra note 147. Professor Henderson explains that state courts have 
used a factors test for determining what third party information should be protected and what 
information should not be afforded protection. See id. at 977. For instance, eleven states have 
rejected the third party doctrine, and eleven more are inclined not to follow it. See id. at 976.  
 163. See id. at 989. These factors include (1) the purpose of the disclosure, (2) the personal 
nature of the information, (3) the amount of information, (4) the expectations of the disclosing 
party, (5) the understanding of the third party, (6) positive law guarantees of confidentiality, 
(7) government need, (8) personal recollections, and (9) changing social norms and 
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eviscerate the neat application of the third party doctrine but allow 
for flexibility based on the situation. The factor-based review leads 
courts to focus on the rationale behind the Katz test, which includes 
the expectations of society and the person performing the 
disclosure.
164
 Ultimately, because society relies on “transactional 
information,” our society “require[s] reformulating that [third party] 
doctrine.”165  
Rather than applying a factor-based test, Matthew D. Lawless 
proposes the third party doctrine need only shift its focus from the 
capacity of the information disclosed to the right to view the 
information.
166
 Essentially, the Court should “place an increased 
emphasis on the agreements and relationships between the parties.”167 
Thus, the Court would turn its focus from whether the transaction 
occurred to whether the parties agreed to and were aware of the 
disclosure. Similarly, Andrew J. DeFilippis posits the Court should 
apply a threshold test to disclosure.
168
 This threshold test would focus 
again on the consent of the parties in deciding whether to limit 
disclosure of the information.
169
 DeFilippis takes the suggestion 
 
technologies. See id. In addition, Professor Henderson discusses what he believes to be 
irrelevant considerations that state courts sometimes focus on, such as (1) the form of the 
information, (2) the “good citizens” motivation of a third party, (3) the government’s method of 
acquisition, and (4) expectations created by police conduct. See id. 
 164. See id. at 988. 
 165. Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 
227, 247 (2012). In his article, Professor Henderson holds that the third party doctrine should 
“apply only to information revealed [to a third party] for that third party’s use.” Stephen E. 
Henderson, Learning from all Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and its States 
Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 
373, 378 (2006).  
 166. See Matthew D. Lawless, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records 
and the Case for a “Crazy Quilt” of Fourth Amendment Protection, 2007 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 
1, 43 (2007). 
 167. See id. Lawless labels his test the “Operational Realities” test. Id. 
 168. See Andrew J. DeFilippis, Securing Informationships: Recognizing a Right to Privity 
in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1109–10 (2006). Of note, DeFilippis 
recognizes that a fundamental flaw in the third party doctrine is that people now share what 
they consider to be private with others. See id. at 1091. 
 169. See id at 1109–10. DeFilippis’ threshold test is (1) whether the third party would limit 
disclosure of the information, and (2) that the limited set of recipients would not include the 
government agent or agency. Id.  
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further and advocates for the inclusion of a second element: the 
government’s investigatory need for the information.170  
Professor Christopher Slobogin offers a fundamentally different 
approach to rethinking the third party doctrine.
171
 Professor Slobogin 
recognizes that “privacy may not be measurable in the predominantly 
normative terms” that courts use to apply Fourth Amendment search 
protection under Katz.
172
 Professor Slobogin points to his empirical 
study, wherein he asks people to note what degree of government 
intrusion violates their privacy rights.
173
 Professor Slobogin 
demonstrates that “transferring information to third parties or 
allowing third parties to accumulate it does not, by itself, lessen the 
intrusiveness of government efforts to obtain it.”174 In particular, the 
degree to which people feel they have a privacy interest depends on 
the third party itself.
175
  
As a result of his findings, Professor Slobogin argues that privacy 
and the third party doctrine should apply a tiered approach to third 
party information.
176
 The authority the police need in order to access 
particular information should depend on which tier the information 
disclosed to the third party is located.
177
 Professor Slobogin believes 
this approach allows for the Fourth Amendment to protect the 
 
 170. See id. If the first two questions are answered in the affirmative, then the government 
would need to get a warrant, unless it could prove that (1) the government agent or agency had 
a need to know the information; (2) obtaining a warrant would have unreasonably hindered a 
government function or investigation; and (3) the methods used to obtain the information were 
reasonable. See id.  
 171. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE 
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007). 
 172. Id. at 182. 
 173. See id. at 184. Unsurprisingly, people find a bedroom search to be the most intrusive 
and a roadblock the least intrusive. Id. Professor Slobogin also discusses the social network 
perspective to privacy, concluding that information a person believes to remain in their social 
network should have an assumption that it will remain private. See id. at 183 (discussing Lior 
Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005)).  
 174. Id. at 183–84.  
 175. See id. For instance, 80.3 percent of people find a privacy interest in bank records, 
while only 34.1 percent find a privacy interest in store patron lists. Id.  
 176. See id. at 185. 
 177. See id. at 186. The four tiers, from least protected to most protected, are: 
(1) organizational records, (2) public records, (3) quasi-private individual records, and (4) 
private individual records. See id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 44:103 
 
 
“personal nature” of third party information while still allowing the 
government to effectively monitor.
178
 
Each of the proposals, while offering different tests, focuses on 
the role a third party plays in the gathering of information.
179
 Thus, 
any reimaging of the third party doctrine by the Court must examine 
how the third party interacts with the individual. The primary 
question, whether information is secret, is immaterial to whether 
information is private. Once this conclusion is accepted, privacy 
rights can adapt to emerging technology. The Court can then fashion 
a test to adapt to emerging technology, using a third party doctrine 
that adequately weighs both security and privacy concerns.  
V. CONCLUSION 
As Professor Katherine J. Strandburg has stated, “the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections must adapt to the broadened context in 
which citizens live their private lives.”180 Echoing this sentiment, 
changes in private lives have led public actors to push more and more 
cases into the lower courts to examine the third party doctrine.
181
 Two 
such cases provide clues about how courts might respond to 
increasing questions about the application of the third party doctrine 
to emerging technology. 
 
 178. See id. at 203. Professor Orin Kerr criticizes Professor Slobogin’s approach. Orin S. 
Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 951 (2009).  Professor 
Kerr’s article finds that Professor Slobogin’s method does not adequately balance privacy and 
security interests, and that the tiered approach is too complicated for courts to apply. See id. at 
952. 
 179. The aforementioned approaches range from a sliding-scale that emphasizes a party’s 
trust in the third party (Murphy), to a fact-heavy analysis (Henderson), to a focus on the role of 
consent in the agreements made between the parties (Lawless and DeFilippis), to creating new 
tiers based on the type of third party information (Slobogin). See supra Part IV. 
 180. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment 
Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 680 (2011). With the increase in 
cloud computing, it is becoming more and more difficult to distinguish at what point a third 
party server becomes a home server. Id. at 657. 
 181. Courts have even started to waver on cell phone records, which, as discussed supra 
note 108, are not considered to be sufficiently private. See In re U.S. ex rel. Order Pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), Nos. C-12-670M, C-12-671M, C-12-672M, C-12-673M, 2012 WL 
4717778, at *3 (Sept. 26, 2012). But see United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (2012).  
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In United States v. Warshak,
182
 the Sixth Circuit held that the 
defendant enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails he 
sent and received, even though they were sent and stored using a 
commercial ISP.
183
 The Warshak court reasoned that the ISP was an 
“intermediary” and not the intended recipient of the e-mail 
message.
184
 Thus, the court held “a subscriber enjoys a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of emails that are stored with, 
or sent or received through, a commercial ISP.”185 The Warshak court 
felt that opening an e-mail was akin to looking at more than the mere 
numbers dialed, the result of which was a privacy violation.
186
  
The reasoning used in Warshak exemplifies one way a new third 
party doctrine analysis can be framed, focusing on A and B, as 
opposed to who gets the information from A to B. Other courts are 
now attempting to apply the Warshak court’s view on emerging 
technology and the Fourth Amendment.
187
 
The Supreme Court also recently reviewed a case directly 
concerning the third party doctrine and technology.
188
 In City of 
Ontario v. Quon, the Court considered whether text messages were 
afforded Fourth Amendment protection when they were sent and 
 
 182. 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). The government suspected the defendants of money 
laundering, among other crimes. See id. at 281. To acquire evidence, the government seized 
approximately 27,000 private e-mails through the defendants’ ISP, without a warrant. Id. 
 183. See id. at 288. 
 184. Id. at 287. 
 185. Id. at 288. 
 186. See id. The Warshak court went further, stating that if the SCA allows the government 
to obtain emails warrantlessly, then “the SCA is unconstitutional.” Id. Ironically, the defendant 
still lost, because the court found the agents acted in good faith. Id. at 292.  
 187. See United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a 
person does not automatically lose her expectation of privacy regarding her e-mails when she 
logs onto a public network); see also R.S. v. Minnewaska, No. 12-588, 2012 WL 3870868 (D. 
Minn. 2012) (holding that a student had a reasonable expectation of privacy with private 
information on a social network account); In the Matter of Applications for Search Warrants for 
Information Associated with Target Email Address, No. 12-MJ-8119-DJW, 2012 WL 4383917 
(D. Kan. 2012) (upholding an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to e-mails stored on an ISP 
and denying a search warrant that asserted otherwise); State v. Clampitt, 364 S.W. 3d 605 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2012) (finding the defendant had an expectation of privacy for sent text messages even 
though they were confiscated on another phone). But see State v. Hinton, 280 P.3d 476 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2012) (holding the defendant does not have an expectation of privacy in sent text 
messages). 
 188. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
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received on a public employee’s pager.189 In the opinion, every 
Justice except Justice Scalia joined the discussion on the reasonable 
expectation of privacy, concluding, “Rapid changes in the dynamics 
of communication and information transmission are evident not just 
in the technology itself but in what society accepts as proper 
behavior.”190 While the Court did not come to a conclusion on the 
third party doctrine, it left open the door to rule on the issue at a later 
time.
191
  
Perhaps that time is now. Congress and the lower courts have 
struggled with developing a clear, concise test to conclude what is a 
reasonable search that utilizes third party technology. It is up to the 
Court of last resort to act and apply either the framework adopted by 
the Warshak court,
192
 Professor Murphy’s sliding scale,193 Professor 
Henderson’s factors test,194 Lawless and DeFilippis’ threshold 
inquiries,
195
 Slobogin’s tiered approach,196 or another approach yet to 
be articulated. The Court must fashion a test that eliminates the third 
party doctrine’s all-or-nothing approach and replace it with a 
standard that focuses on how a third party acquires an individual’s 
information. At the very least, if a third party is a mere carrier of 
information from A to B, the law should ensure that A has not given 
up his privacy interest in that information. 
While Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones is not mandatory 
authority, the fact that a Supreme Court Justice articulated the need 
for a reimagining of the third party doctrine is an encouraging step 
towards positive change. Just as Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz 
proved influential, eventually becoming law, so too may Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence yield ripe fruit for pro-privacy interests. 
 
 189. The Court ruled the search was reasonable because it was a government pager, 
completely side-stepping the Fourth Amendment issue. Id. at 2631.  
 190. Id. at 2629. 
 191. The Ninth Circuit determined the defendant did have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the text messages, due to the informal policy of the employer. This part of the Ninth 
Circuit opinion was not overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision, leaving it open for future 
courts. See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892, 902 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 192. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra notes 157–60 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text. 
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